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Board Game Liability
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without fault, to words or pictures.
Thus, Watters could not recover
damages without proof that TSR
violated its duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent foreseeable
injury.
The court first addressed Watters' argument that TSR was at
fault for putting Dungeons and
Dragons on the market without
attempting to ascertain the mental
conditions of prospective players.
The court held that TSR did not
fail to exercise ordinary care since
the only method of guaranteeing
that Dungeons and Dragons would
not reach "mentally fragile" individuals would be to stop its sales of
the game entirely.
Next the court of appeals addressed Watters' contention that
TSR breached a duty to warn of the
possible consequences of playing
the game, including a player's loss
of control of mental processes.
Under Kentucky law, manufacturers and suppliers have a general
duty to warn of dangers known to
them but not known to anticipated
users of the product. Though it
determined that Johnny was one of
the class of persons whose use of
the game could have been reasonably anticipated, the court found
Watters failed to prove TSR could
have foreseen Johnny's suicide.
According to the court, TSR's
motion for summary judgment required Watters to cite specific facts
showing that TSR possessed
knowledge of a danger which made
Johnny's death foreseeable. In her
affidavit, however, Watters admitted only to reading publications
which discussed the dangerous
propensities of the game. She described her son as well-behaved
throughout the period when he
regularly played Dungeons and
Dragons with his friends. The
court reasoned that if Johnny's
mother could not foresee the suicide, TSR could not be expected to
foresee the boy's death either.
In addition, the court concluded
that, based on the content of the
materials which accompanied the

game, TSR would not have been
able to foresee that players of the
game would be more susceptible to
suicide than non-players. The
court compared the violence and
depravity of television and movies
to which children are exposed with
the "let's pretend" nature of Dungeons and Dragons. The court
found that Dungeons and Dragons
only required a player to imagine a
fanciful world; this mythological
world was not based on suicide or
cruelty. The court noted that no
Kentucky case law existed which
placed a duty to warn on television
networks and book publishers with
respect to creative works which
might be linked to anti-social behavior. Furthermore, the only case
law on point supported TSR's first
amendment argument. Moreover,
there had never been a similar
claim against producers and publishers for the actions of persons
allegedly prompted by watching
television shows and reading magazines where there was no direct
incitement to act. In the absence of
specific facts indicating that TSR's
game was in fact dangerous or that
TSR had knowledge of any danger
with respect to the game and its
effect on players, Watters failed to
sustain her cause of action.
Lastly, the court of appeals considered Watters' assertion that
TSR's manufacturing and sale of
Dungeons and Dragons proximately caused her son's death. According to the court, there cannot be
liability in a negligence action if
the negligence did not cause the
injury. The court recognized that
under Kentucky law, unforeseeable, extraordinary actions may
interrupt the chain of causation. In
this case, the court held that Johnny's suicide was an unforeseeable
and intervening act.
Although exceptions to the general rule that suicide constitutes an
independent and intervening act
do exist, such as in the area of
worker's compensation or in a situation where someone with suicidal
tendencies is placed in the care of a
custodian, the court found that
Watters failed to present facts suggesting Johnny's suicide fit into
either exception. There was no

evidence that Johnny suffered
from psychosis or had suicidal tendencies. Thus, the court concluded
that whether Johnny would not
have shot himself had he not constantly played Dungeons and Dragons was open to speculation.
The Sixth Circuit held that Watters had failed to establish there
was a genuine issue for trial under
the standards of Kentucky negligence law. Therefore, the court of
appeals affirmed the district
court's decision to grant TSR's
motion for summary judgment.
Elizabeth Barnes

AN "AS IS" CLAUSE IN
A DEED OF
CONVEYANCE DOES
NOT PROTECT
RESPONSIBLE
PARTIES AGAINST
STRICT LIABILITY FOR
CLEANUP COSTS
UNDER CERCLA
In Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp.
v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957
(N.D.Cal. 1990), the United States
District Court for the Northern
District of California held that a
former property owner who disposed of hazardous wastes on
property sold could not rely upon
an "as is" provision in the deed to
the contaminated property to escape strict liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 &
Supp. 1988).
Background
On May 23, 1975, NL Industries, Inc. ("NL") sold twentythree acres of property in California to Wiegmann & Rose Machine
Works ("Wiegmann"). In September 1985, Wiegmann sold all of its
stock to Wiegmann & Rose International Corporation ("W & R").
NL alleged that the deed conveyed
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the described property as well as
the buildings and appurtenances
thereon in an "as is" condition. At
no time did NL disclose that a
portion of the land contained hazardous wastes.
In 1980, five years after the sale,
Congress enacted CERCLA to facilitate the cleanup of property
contaminated with hazardous
wastes. That same year, the California Department of Health and
Human Services ("CDHS") notified W & R that it had discovered
hazardous wastes on the property.
Used foundry sands that had been
dumped on the property in the
early 1970's had contaminated the
land with heavy metals. In response to CDHS's request for remedial action, W & R installed
groundwater monitoring wells, analyzed soil borings and prepared
proposals and reports regarding
the cleanup of the site.
In August of 1988, in response
to CDHS's request for investigation, W & R excavated a portion of
the property and discovered buried
metal drums that had leaked and
contaminated the land with used
industrial solvents. There was evidence that the drums were buried
on the site in 1973 or 1974. Subsequently, W & R planned remedial
action to clean up the property.
In December of 1988, W & R
sued NL and Esselte Pendaflex
Corporation ("EP") for over
$500,000 to recover costs already
incurred as well as those costs
which W & R anticipated incurring
in the future with respect to the
contaminated property. In its complaint, W & R alleged two causes of
action under the CERCLA statute
and two causes of action under the
state law of equitable indemnity.
NL moved for summary judgment
only with respect to the issue of
CERCLA liability. EP joined in
W & R's opposition to the motion.
CERCLA Cause of Action
CERCLA requires parties responsible for disposing hazardous
wastes to bear the cleanup costs of
the conditions they created. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 &
Supp. 1988). Congress created a
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private cause of action for recovery
of response costs against the owner
or operator of a facility at the time
hazardous substances were disposed or against any other contributor to the dumping of wastes
under § 9607(a) of CERCLA. To
establish liability under § 9607(a)
of CERCLA, the plaintiff must
show: (1) that the defendant falls
within one of the classes of potentially liable parties including anyone who owned or operated a
facility at which hazardous wastes
were disposed of, (2) that there was
a release or threatened release of
the hazardous substance, (3) from
the facility, and (4) that the release
caused the plaiatiff to incur some
amount of response costs. W & R
alleged that NL owned the property in question during the time the
hazardous wastes were dumped on
the property and that EP was the
successor to the corporation that
buried the metal drums.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, such responsible
persons are strictly liable for response costs under CERCLA.
However, a person may escape
liability pursuant to § 9607(b) of
CERCLA if he can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that
the release of a hazardous substance and related damages were
caused by (1) an act of God, (2) an
act of war, or (3) an act or omission
of a third party, if the defendant
proves he exercised due care with
respect to the hazardous substance
and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the
third party and the resulting consequences of the acts or omissions.
Assuming W & R could prove the
necessary elements of a CERCLA
cause of action and NL and EP
could not prove the third party
defense mentioned above, NL and
EP would be strictly liable to W &
R for all response costs. Nevertheless, NL moved for summary judgment based upon an "as is" clause
in the deed of conveyance.
"As Is" Clause
In NL's motion for summary
judgment, NL argued that W & R
released NL from all CERCLA

liability with respect to costs of
removing hazardous wastes from
the property because NL conveyed
the property to W & R in an "as is"
condition. First, NL argued that
state law rather than federal law
should be applied in interpreting
the clause. Second, NL contended
that under California law the "as
is" clause in the deed released NL
from all possible claims, including
CERCLA liability, with respect to
the contaminated property.
NL cited Marden v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir.
1986) in support of its argument
that state law should govern the
interpretation of the clause. In that
case, the Ninth Circuit applied
New York law to interpret the
scope of a release clause. The purchaser in Marden bought a manufacturing plant and a settling pond.
The parties entered into a comprehensive settlement and release
agreement subsequent to the purchase agreement. Under the settlement agreement, the seller paid the
purchaser $995,000 in settlement
of all claims arising out of the
purchase agreement. The purchaser later brought suit against the
seller for hazardous waste cleanup
costs under CERCLA.
Applying New York law, the
Ninth Circuit found that the parties intended the agreement to include a release of CERCLA liability. The court upheld the release
because the purchaser intentionally waived his right to response cost
recovery. At the time of the sale,
both parties knew that the property
contained hazardous wastes and
appreciated the possibility of administrative enforcement action.
Furthermore, the parties could
have anticipated the possibility of
liability from response costs since
CERCLA was enacted one year
prior to the execution of the settlement agreement.
District Court's Analysis
The district court declined to
apply California law in interpreting the "as is" clause in the deed
from NL to W & R. As a general
rule, federal law governs the validi(continued on page 28)
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ty of releases of federal causes of
action. However, in interpreting
the meaning and scope of the releases as intended by the parties,
state law may determine the content of federal law. If the application of state law would frustrate the
objectives of CERCLA, federal law
should be applied to interpret the
"'as is" clause.
In choosing not to apply state
law, the district court did not imply that the result under California
law would be different from the
result under federal law. The district court merely found it unnecessary to draw upon any provisions
of California law since the application of federal law would always
yield results consistent with the
objectives of the federal statute.
Therefore, the district court held
that it could rely solely upon federal law to interpret the "as is" clause
of the deed.
Applying federal law to NL's
claim, the district court distinguished the Marden decision. Unlike the purchaser in Marden, W &
R had no knowledge of the contamination at the time of purchase.
Because the conveyance between
NL and W & R occurred five years
prior to the enactment of CERCLA, the parties could not have
anticipated the possibility of response costs. In contrast to the
Marden parties who negotiated a
comprehensive settlement agreement with respect to the contaminated property, NL included a
standard "as is" clause in its conveyance of the property to W & R
without negotiating its specific
terms. Accordingly, the district
court found that NL originally intended the "as is " clause only to
protect itself from any breach of
warranty claims typically covered
by such clauses and not from CERCLA liability.
The district court noted that
permitting a responsible party to
avoid liability through a standard
"as is" clause would frustrate the
language and intent of CERCLA.
The sale of property subject to an
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"as is" provision is not one of the
three defenses to strict liability
defined in § 9607(b) of CERCLA.
Furthermore, § 9607(e) of CERCLA explicitly states that no hold
harmless conveyance is effective to
transfer liability away from a
strictly liable party. Most importantly, the district court noted that
one of the primary goals of CERCLA is to require responsible parties to bear the cleanup costs of the
hazardous conditions they created.
In accordance with the objectives of the CERCLA statute, the
district court held that NL could
not rely upon an "as is" clause of
the deed as a release from strict
liability under CERCLA. Therefore, the district court denied NL's
motion for summary judgment.
Rosemary G. Milew

DEBTOR ENTITLED TO
RESCIND CONSUMER
CREDIT TRANSACTION
FOR CREDITOR'S
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO
CHOOSE INSURANCE
CARRIER
The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that a creditor's
failure to inform the debtor of his
right to choose a home insurer
under a consumer credit transaction constituted a material violation of the Truth In Lending Act.
In re Moore, 117 B.R. 135
(Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1990). In Moore,
the creditor's error, although merely a technicality, made the debtor's
subsequent rescission of the loan
valid, and allowed him to collect
statutory damages, costs and attorneys' fees for the creditor's failure
to acknowledge properly the rescission.
Background
Russell L. Moore ("the Debtor"), an elderly widower, applied

for a loan from Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co. ("MidPenn"). As a condition of its loans,
Mid-Penn requires that borrowers
use their homes as collateral and
that the homes be insured. When
no mortgage is outstanding, MidPenn requires the borrower to
prove that the home is adequately
insured or to allow Mid-Penn to
obtain insurance. Because the
Debtor had paid off the original
mortgage on his home the year
before his loan application, MidPenn asked him to prove he had
insurance.
The Debtor told Mid-Penn that
he had insurance coverage from
the American Bankers Insurance
Company of Florida ("Bankers"),
but Mid-Penn later discovered that
the policy had lapsed. Mid-Penn
then attempted to renew the policy
for the Debtor and added the
amount of the renewal fee to the
balance of the principal borrowed.
Mid-Penn excluded the amount of
Mid-Penn's insurance renewal
payment in computing the finance
charge. When Bankers refused to
renew the Debtor's policy, MidPenn obtained alternative coverage through an insurance company
of its own choice, without asking
the Debtor whether he preferred a
specific company. This new policy
cost less than the Bankers policy,
so Mid-Penn refunded the difference to the Debtor. Mid-Penn then
gave the Debtor a Truth In Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1700 (1988), disclosure statement which showed the payment
of the renewal fee as part of the
principal. Neither the TILA statement nor any other document
Mid-Penn gave to the Debtor,
however, mentioned that the Debtor could choose any company as
provider of the required insurance
coverage.
Approximately eighteen months
after obtaining the loan, the Debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case. Mid-Penn filed a secured
Proof of Claim with the bankruptcy court, seeking the amount of the
principal, legal charges and additional interest. The Debtor attacked Mid-Penn's Proof of Claim,
alleging that prior to the bankrupt-
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